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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous étudions les conséquences économiques des exigences en matière de réglementation des valeurs 
mobilières  dans  une  situation  où  l’asym￩trie  informationnelle  est  importante  et  les  contraintes 
r￩glementaires  limit￩es.  Au  Canada,  les  entreprises  peuvent  s’inscrire  en  Bourse  alors  qu’elles  ne 
rapportent pas de revenu. Elles peuvent utiliser le processus classique du premier appel public à l’￩pargne 
ou utiliser une m￩thode d’inscription d￩guis￩e par prise de contrôle invers￩e. La supervision des autorités 
en mati￨re de valeurs mobili￨res est plus l￩g￨re dans ce cas, et le processus d’inscription se fait beaucoup 
plus rapidement. En tenant compte des multiples caract￩ristiques incluant l’endog￩n￩it￩ du choix du mode 
d’entr￩e, nous montrons que le choix du mode d’entr￩e et donc de la rigueur de la supervision influence 
de façon significative la valeur et la performance boursière à long terme des émetteurs. Nos résultats 
suggèrent  que  l’entreprise  qui  se  soumet  à  une  supervision  plus  stricte  diminue  l’asym￩trie 
informationnelle,  le  coût  du  capital,  la  dispersion  des  anticipations  et  les  erreurs  d’￩valuation  des 
investisseurs.  
 
Mots clés : Divulgation, réglementation des valeurs mobilières, prise de contrôle 
invers￩e, norme minimales d’inscription en Bourse. 
 
We  analyze  the  economic  consequences  of  disclosure  and  regulation  within  a  context  of 
significant information asymmetry and lenient regulation. In Canada, firms can enter the stock market at 
a pre-revenue stage by fulfilling each of the requirements of an initial public offerings or using reverse 
mergers. This backdoor listing method implies a smoother oversight by the securities commission and a 
shorter process based on private placements. Controlling for several dimensions, including self-selection, 
we find that the choice of the listing method and regulation strictness significantly influence the value and 
long-run performance of newly listed firms. These results are consistent with theories suggesting that a 
commitment by a firm to a stricter regulatory oversight lowers the information asymmetry component of 
the cost of capital, reduces the heterogeneity of expectations and mispricing. 
 
Keywords: Disclosure, Securities Regulation, Initial Public Offerings, Reverse Mergers, 
Listing Standards. 
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Security issuance is subject to the risk that corporate issuers will sell bad securities to the 
public (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 2006; Campbell 2009).  The “appropriate” or 
“fair” level of regulatory requirements for new listings is subject to  ongoing debate. Several 
authors argue for easing the rules for smaller entities (Cohn 1999; Chiu 2003; Friedman and 
Grose 2006). Campbell (2009 p.1) states that “one of the most curious and misdirected regulatory 
approaches of the Securities and Exchange Commission is the Commission's relentless refusal to 
permit small businesses to solicit broadly for external capital.” In the U.S. the listing process is 
generally considered long and costly, especially for small and medium-sized companies (Cohn 
1999). Thus, some authors recommend that firms should be allowed to list without fulfilling the 
full initial public offering (IPO) disclosure process, and even further recommend that Reverse 
Mergers (RMs), also known as a backdoor listing method, can be a useful tool for smaller firms 
(Heyman 2007).  
Because the variation between the characteristics of newly listed firms is limited without a 
„left tail‟ of low quality issuers, analyzing the effect of listing and disclosure requirements is an 
empirical question difficult to address in the U.S. context. As such, recent studies of the effects of 
regulation on the cost of capital use cross-national comparisons (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny 2002; Hail and Leuz 2006) or regulatory changes in foreign countries (Black 
and Khanna 2007). In this paper, by contrast, we approach this issue by comparing IPOs and 
RMs in a non-U.S. context where the regulatory standards for listing are extremely low. 
In Canada, regulators allow easy access to the market via RMs, and new listings are divided 
almost  equally  between  RMs  and  IPOs.  In  an  IPO,  the  firm  has  to  meet  all  the  regulatory 
requirements, provide a prospectus and comply with a strictly defined and clear process. This 
process takes generally six to twelve months. In sharp contrast, the RM process is not defined in 
Securities  Laws  and  is  more  opaque  and  complex.  This  listing  method  presents  the  unique 
characteristic that the main disclosure is required after the main financing has been completed. 
Moreover, all the operations can be closed in one or two months, a situation less favorable to an 
accurate  analysis  of  the  information.  Such  backdoor  listings  have  acquired  a  bad  reputation 
(Pavkov 2005; Floros and Shastri 2009; Gleason, Jain and Rosenthal 2009).  
RMs and IPOs exhibit similar characteristics in Canada -- such as size, profitability, and 




performance of the newly listed companies. Hence, this paper enables an analysis of the effects of 
lax regulatory requirements for listing in a developed market with potentially more pronounced 
effects than in the U.S. The low listing requirements create a situation with massive asymmetric 
information, risk, and uncertainty faced by the purchasers of newly listed firms. The analysis of 
backdoor listing effects is of interest in several countries where RMs are becoming common. 
Such RMs generally use cash shells, including the Investment Companies in the U.K. and the 
U.S. Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) (Berger 2008). In the U.S., 1065 RM 
listings are reported from 2004 to 2008 (Feldman 2009 p.3). Accordingly, RM are overriding the 
IPO market, where 672 deals only are reported on the Jay Ritter website.
1 
Based on a sample of 1,455 IPOs and RMs between 1993 and 2003,  with both short- and 
long-term performance data up to the latter part of the pre -crisis period, comprising more than 
60% of the new listings population, our findings are as follows: 
1: Low listing requirements negatively affect investor wealth. The long -run returns that 
follow Canadian IPOs and RM listings are extremely poor . They are  significantly lower than 
those reported for IPOs in other countries. The proportion of negative raw or excess returns can 
reach 60%  to 70% depending on the  specification. The assessment that higher initial listing 
requirements protect investors is confirmed in our context of very low listing standards. 
2:  A  careful analysis of the return distributions indicates that a few newly listed  firms 
produce huge returns. A preference for skewness can explain why the investors still participate in 
these offerings, since they resemble lottery stocks. Investors involved in IPOs and RM s do not 
exhibit the characteristics of rational behaviour in the classical mean-variance scheme. 
3:  Even if RMs  and IPOs share many characteristics, the analysis of the self -selection 
problem indicates that the lower quality firms opt for the less regulated  RMs to obtain a public 
listing. RMs are smaller  firms,  more often  exhibit negative earnings, and often do not have  
revenues. This observation is in line with the “lemon market” proposition stated by Black (2001). 
Black (2001) considers that rigorous disclosure rules are a precondition for a strong securities 
market, and our findings are strongly consistent with this proposition. 
4: If timely disclosure and the rigorous process associated with the IPO are informative 
above and beyond the lighter regulation surrounding RMs, then IPOs should have a lower cost of 
                                                 




capital than RMs. Thus, IPOs should receive higher valuations. We evidence a strong effect of 
the choice of listing mode on the value that the firms can obtain for the new shares issued during 
the listing. In terms of the earnings, the multiple obtained through IPOs is twice that observed for 
RMs. We carefully control for the other dimensions that can influence the valuation, including 
but not limited to self-selection between the two listing modes, in order to carefully assess the 
observed effect of the listing process and requirement.  
5: Both IPOs and RMs are overpriced, as evidenced by the long run underperformance of 
both groups of issuers. Biases, including overconfidence and overoptimism, are likely to be larger 
for RM than for IPOs. Asymmetry and opacity are higher for RMs than for IPOs, and timely 
disclosure is only available for IPOs. Accordingly, valuation mistakes should be observed more 
frequently for RMs than for IPOs. Moreover, the cost of capital increase linked with the listing 
choice is likely to prevail during a long period of time. Then IPOs should exhibit better long-run 
performance. Indeed, we find that IPOs have less negative long-term returns than RMs. All else 
being equal, investing in firms that list with certified and timely disclosure is better than investing 
in  firms  that bypass  the  strict  IPO process.  In  our analyses, we control to  the fullest  extent 
possible for the other possible determinants of performance and self-selection. 
These results suggest that for both the issuer and the investors, there is significant benefit to 
voluntary submit themselves to the stricter requirements of the IPO process. Overall, our results 
suggest  that  disclosure  characteristics  including  timeliness,  certification  and  approval  by 
securities commissions have a significant economic impact. These results are consistent with 
theories  suggesting  that  a  commitment  by  a  firm  to  a  stricter  regulatory  process  mitigates 
information asymmetry and thereby lowers the cost of capital. These results are also consistent 
with the hypothesis that timely and certified disclosure reduces mispricing.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we develop propositions in the context of 
the related IPO and RM literature. In Section III we introduce the data and present summary 
statistics.  We explain our empirical  methods  in  Section  IV, and we present  our econometric 
results in Section V. Section VI describes policy implications and concludes.   
 




We first present the distinctive characteristics of the Canadian market and RM listings in 
Canada. Then we present the elements of market valuation theory required to discuss the effects 
of the choice of the listing method on prices and long-run performance. Lastly, we present our 
propositions. 
A. IPOs and RMs in Canada 
Minimum listing standards and securities regulation limit a firm‟s access to stock markets 
based on firm size and earnings, among other things, and they require extensive information 
disclosure in the way of promoting market quality and investor protection (Macey and O'Hara 
2002).  Minimum listing standards are strikingly different in Canada and the U.S.   
To highlight the characteristics of the Canadian market, it is worth briefly reviewing the 
situation in the U.S.  In this country, securities regulation requires that firms that seek listing 
comply  with  a  prospectus  requirement  that  must  be  filed  with  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission  (SEC)  as  part  of  a  registration  statement.  The  SEC's  rationale  has  been  that 
regulators are gatekeepers whose strict requirements protect investors and market integrity and 
thereby reduce the cost of equity for listed firms. U.S. regulations on security issuance have 
increased in recent years. When revising the Penny Stock Rule in 2005, the SEC required that 
newly listed firms to have positive net income, that the market value of their listed securities be at 
least $50 million, and that the securities‟ minimum bid price be $4 per share. The SEC also 
strongly limited a firm‟s capacity to escape the initial listing requirement by using a RM. SEC 
Rule 419 severely restricted Blank Check Companies,  commonly used in  the 1980s  as  shell 
companies to facilitate RMs. On January 4, 1999, the SEC approved the “eligibility rule,” which 
required  all  domestic  Over-the-Counter  Bulletin  Board  firms  to  comply  with  the  reporting 
obligations under the 1934 Act (Bushee and Leuz 2005). 
The first distinctive characteristic of the Canadian securities market is its very low level of 
listing requirements. For a listing on Tier 2 of the junior market -- the TSXV -- a firm must meet 
the following conditions: stock price over CAN$0.15 and post-IPO net tangible assets and market 
capitalization  higher  than  CAN$500,000.
2  The  TSXV  has  no  requirements  for  issuers‟ 
profitability. As a result, from 1986 to 2006, more than 80% of listing firms report negative 
                                                 
2 Corresponding values for NASDAQ from June 1999 to June 2001 were US$4 (price), US$4 million for 




earnings  at  the  time  of  listing,  and  close  to  50%  report  no  revenues.  The  pre-IPO  median 
shareholder s‟ equity (total asset) in newly listed companies was CAN$260,000 (CAN$710,000) 
and the median IPO gross proceed was CAN$670,000 (Carpentier, L'Her and Suret 2010). In the 
U.S., for penny stocks IPOs, the median total asset was US$7.16 million and the median gross 
proceed was US$5.5 million (Floros and Shastri 2009). Canadian newly listed companies are 
approximately 10% the size of U.S. penny stock IPO firms. This implies that entrepreneurial 
ventures have access to the stock market, and that they constitute the bulk of the entering firms. 
Such ventures could not enter the other junior markets in the world.
3 This is an important point, 
because the problems of information asymmetry and adverse selection  are particularly acute for 
entrepreneurial ventures seeking for external equity financing. The second distinctive feature of 
the Canadian market is  the promotion, by the exchange, of RM listings and the low level of 
regulatory constraint that is placed on firms that opt for this method.  
An RM is a method used by a private firm (the entrant firm) to become publicly traded 
without issuing an IPO.  We illustrate a classical RM  transaction in  Figure 1. The RM listing 
includes a merger between a public shell company, which is generally inactive, and privately held 
operating  company.  Canadian  shell  generally  has  a  very  low  market  value ,  and  Figure  1 
illustrates a typical shell with a value of  CAN$100,000, based on 500,000 shares priced at 
CAN$0.20. Currently operating closed firms that seek listing usually have a much higher value: 
for example 500,000 shares priced at CAN$1. The resulting company, here named Result inc., is 
a product of the merger of the two former firms. This merger entails  generally an exchange of 
shares:
4 the shareholders of the entrant firm and of the shell exchange their shares for those of the 
new entity, Result inc. The difference  in value between the shell and the operating company 
means that the shareholders of the private operating company will acquire the majority of the 
                                                 
3 The “new” markets in Europe devoted to growing companies generally require minimum gross proceeds 
of Euro5 million (CAN$8 million). Several junior markets, like the AIM, First North or NZAX apply 
principles-based listing requirements. They do not require a numerical threshold but require the entrant to 
get  a  sponsor. The  average  gross proceeds  of  the  IPO  firm  joining  AIM  in London is equivalent  to 
CAN$15 million. On First North, in the Nordic countries, the mean market capitalization was equivalent 
to CAN$85.53 million. In 2009, January, the 34 small firms listed on the NZAX had a total capitalization 
of NZ$633 million, for an average (post crisis) capitalization equivalent to CAN$12.5 million. Even if 
they use principles in lieu of rules, these exchanges do not list entrepreneurial ventures at early stages.  
4 Most often, RMs involve the acquisition by the listed shell of either the assets of a private firm or all of 
its outstanding shares in exchange for the shares of the shell. If the shell acquires all or part of th e 




shares of the resulting entity. This transaction is called an RM because the shareholders of the 
private company ultimately control the public shell company. As a result of the RM, the private 
company  becomes  public  by  buying  the  shell,  without  issuing  a  classical  and  reviewed 
prospectus,  selling  new  shares  to  the  public,  or  meeting  the  minimum  listing  requirements. 
“Classic” shells are once-active companies that failed to develop and ceased or strongly reduced 
their activities, but have kept their stature as public companies. “Manufactured” shells are created 
specifically from nothing, using the Capital Pool Program (Carpentier and Suret 2006). After the 
RM, the private firm (the resulting firm) becomes publicly traded and has to comply with the 
ongoing listing requirements. At this stage, disclosure requirements are similar for RM and IPO 
firms. 
Newly listed companies using an RM are exempt from filing a prospectus and need not 
comply with  the registration requirements  prevailing for  IPOs.  RMs,  amalgamation, or other 
similar procedures are used to take advantage of the prospectus and registration exemptions in 
provincial securities legislations (Brock, 2000). This legislation implies that the RM firms cannot 
issue shares publicly. They get the cash available in the shell and, in the majority of the cases we 
observe, they issue shares privately. The private placements associated with an RM are generally 
too  small  for  institutional  investors.  In  Figure  1,  we  consider  that  private  investors  get  a 
participation of CAN$100,000. That gives them a 14.29% proportion of control. Then, if we omit 
the  transaction  cost,  the  value  of  Result  inc.  is  equal  to  CAN$700,000  [CAN$500,000  (the 
entrant) + CAN$100,000 (the shell) + CAN$100,000 (the private placement)]. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
B. The regulatory dimension 
IPOs and RMs differ along two main dimensions related to regulation: 1) complexity and 
diversity and 2) disclosure, including the certification, approval and timeliness dimensions. As a 
result  of  the  weaker  regulatory  oversight,  the  asymmetry  of  information  is  likely  to  remain 
stronger for RM than for IPOs and the RMs perception by the market is generally negative.  
Complexity and diversity: in contrast to IPOs, RMs are not defined in the Securities Laws 
or  Rules  of  the  main  provinces  (Petit  2002).
5  The  regulator  is  involved  indirectly  in  the 
                                                 
5  In Canada, securities laws are administered and enforced by a provincial securities commission. A 




transaction because it implies an acquisition, exchanges of share or a material changes. The RM 
can be structured in several ways and the sections of the Law evocated in the transaction differ 
according to the structure of the deal.
6 As stated by Feldman (2009 p.145) in RM  “there are 
many tricks and traps that are easy to fall into even if one is an experienced securities attorney, 
auditor,  investment  banker  or  operating  company  executive.”  Lastly,  RMs  are  also  complex 
operations from an accounting point of view and the analysts of the securities commission in the 
Quebec province
7 noted that the accounting treatment applied by many issuers with respect to 
RMs does not follow  GAAPs. The commission required many issuers to file restated financial 
statements. The RM complexity implies that these operations are less easy to understand and 
appraise than classical IPOs.  
Disclosure: Policy 5.2 Changes of business and reverse take-overs of the TSXV Corporate 
Finance Manual (as at June 30, 2001) describes the RM disclosure requirements for the period 
under analysis. First, when an agreement in principle is reached, the issuer has to prepare and 
submit to the corporate finance department of the exchange a comprehensive news release that 
includes the date of the agreement and a description of the assets, business, property or interest 
                                                                                                                                                              
a uniform securities regulation regime is in the works. However, during the period we analyze, several 
differences  existed  between  the  provinces,  mainly  in  the  area  of  exempt  placements  where  private 
placements associated with RMs take place. 
6 As an example, Petit (2002, p.41) contend s that the exchange of shares included in the transaction 
constitute a placement that can be relat ed to 6 different section s of the  Securities Law.  RMs can be 
structured as an exchange of shares, an asset acquisition, properties or interest therein. Petit (2002, p.35) 
describes six of the possible paths for completing a RM. Several RM include an amalgamation process. 
This is an example of such a transaction, related to  Pason Systems Inc, on line on the British Columbia 
Securities Commission Web site:   “The  Filer  is  a  public  company  amalgamated  under  the  Business 
Corporations Act (Alberta) on November 1, 1996. The amalgamation was part of an overall transaction 
which  occurred  on  October  31,  1996  whereby  Mark  8  Ventures  Inc.  (“Mark  8”)  pursuant  to  an 
acquisition agreement among Pason Systems Corp., all of its shareholders and Mark 8, acquired all of the 
outstanding shares of Pason Systems Corp. on the basis of 38,843 common shares of Mark 8 for each 
Class A common share of Pason Systems Corp. A total of 10,176,860 common shares of Mark 8 were 
issued to the shareholders of Pason Systems Corp. in connection with such acquisition. Following this 
acquisition, Mark 8 amalgamated with 693867 Alberta Ltd. a wholly owned subsidiary of Mark 8 to form 
the Filer. Prior to November 1, 1996 the Filer (or Mark 8) had no significant assets and was inactive. The 
reverse takeover, which occurred on this date, represented a transition in the business of Mark 8 from an 
Alberta junior capital company to an oilfield service company specializing in drilling instrumentation 
systems.” The intricacy of the various methods that can be used are exposed in details by Feldman (2009) 
or Sjostrom (2008). 





therein to be acquired. However, the main filed document is the information circular
8 that is 
prepared in accordance with securities laws. Basically, as stated by Brock (2000 p.3),
9 RMs and 
IPOs  imply  the  production  and  filing   of  similar  documents.  However,  several  important 
differences exist between the two  listing methods. In the IPO case, a preliminary prospectus is 
submitted to the securities commission. Then the issuer has to get a preliminary visa and the 
prospectus  is  resubmitted  in the final version to obtain the definitive visa.  The new issue 
promotion is strictly regulated during this process. The RM information circular has simply to be 
filed but it is not reviewed by the securities commission.
10 Moreover, the investment banker plays 
a significant role of certification  during the IPO process  and reputable investment bankers  are 
generally associated with lower  IPO underpricing. They contribute to  reduce the asymmetry of 
information (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). RMs do not involve investment bankers at all. The 
information circular is thus neither approved nor certified.  
Timeliness: The IPO prospectus is a prerequisite to the sale of shares. This is not the case 
for the information circular in an RM. The main objective of this document is to inform the 
existing  shareholders  about  the  proposed  merger.  It  should  be  filed  before  the  shareholders 
meeting. According to Policy 5.2 (at 5.8) “any concurrent transaction must be disclosed.” This 
implies  that  the  private  investors  should  book  their  placement  before  the  release  of  the 
information circular. To verify this important point, we analysed in depth the various documents 
associated with two groups of RMs. This first group of 33 RMs report no financing, while the 
second group of 15 other RMs was randomly selected. In the first group, we detected 17 cases 
without any placement and 16 cases of private placements completed before the RM, in the shell 
or in the operating company. These placements were not mentioned in the circular. In the second 
group, the private placements are completed or booked before the release of the circular and 
                                                 
8 A filing statement replaces the information circular when the transaction is at arm‟s length and a meeting 
of security holders is not otherwise required by law. Differences between both documents are not material 
and they can be neglected here. The differences in disclosure between IPOs and RMs were eliminated in 
2005, following the adoption of NI 51-102 (Section 4.10), and the related amendments to this instrument 
that were adopted during the subsequent years (after the period in our dataset). 
9  The  content  of  the  circular  is  defined  in  the  FORM  51 -102F5  document,  available  at  :  
http://www.msc.gov.mb.ca/legal_docs/legislation/notices/51_102f5_2nd.pdf 
10 This can explain why, in some transactions, the information was far from the prospectus level (see, as 
an example, the Augusta Metals Incorporated -CyberCom System, in 2000, where the sole financial 




announced in the circular.
11 In terms of disclosure, RM constitutes an unique situation where the 
information is disclosed after the financing. This is a significant difference with the IPO process, 
where the offering can only be done several months after the filing of the preliminary prospectus. 
Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins (2005) estimate that IPOs take a minimum of 6 months while 
RMs take between 1 and 3 months. Such a fast process is not favourable to a good analysis of the 
available information. We have illustrated in Appendix the time line of a RM listing using a 
capital pool shell and the sources of informational asymmetry.
12 
Asymmetry: In an IPO, the asymmetry exists mainly between the investors and the owner of 
the  private  company,  and  it  is  reduced  by  the  prospectus  and  the  involvement  of  reputable 
intermediaries. The preliminary prospectus is available several months before the issue. Upfront, 
RM firms are generally more opaque than IPO firms (Floros and Shastri 2009). The RM involves 
several stakeholders with diverse sets of  information, mainly when the shell is a capital pool 
company (Carpentier and Suret 2006 p.51). As illustrated in the Appendix, an RM involves the 
promoters of the shell, who are the first to identify the target firm. The promoters sometimes 
know the target firm at the inception of the shell.
13 The shell‟s shareholders are composed of 
three groups. The first group provides the seed financing of the shell and is likely to share some 
information  with  the promoters. The second  group invests at  the shell  IPO, when the target 
cannot  be  mentioned  by  Law.  The  third  group  trades  the  shell  shares  before  the  RM,  but 
generally discovers the target at the pre-meeting filing.
14 The managers of the target own private 
information but this  information will become public  only  after the closing of the financing. 
Private investors implied during and after the merger can perhaps analyze preliminary draft of the 
                                                 
11  The sole  exception is a placement  completed  several  months after the  RM.  A  typical information 
circular reports that the extraordinary meeting will be held to approve the RM and: “To consider and, if 
thought advisable, to pass an ordinary resolution approving a private placement, in which related parties 
of the Company will participate, consisting of 6,830,000 units of the Company at $0.12 per unit, with each 
unit comprising one common share and one share purchase warrant entitling the holder to purchase a 
further common share for a period of two years (…)” (Transac Enterprise corp., on July 10, 2003).  
12 We illustrate the case of a RM listing that uses the capital pool company program, because this is the 
most common case in our sample. RMs on classical shells pres ent similar characteristics, but the exact 
characteristics of the shell, including potential hidden liabilities, add a supplementary dimension to the 
information problems. 
13 This assumption is based on the fact that several RMs occur a few weeks after the shell creation, and on 
the observation that several shell promoters are also involved in the target company. 
14 To confirm this point, we selected the 50 RMs that exhibit the higher pre-merger returns. The maximum 
monthly return we observed is 90.9%. We car efully scrutinize SEDAR to conclude that no piece of 




circular, but the final version of the circular has to include their commitment. Joint to the fact that 
the circular had not been under review by the securities commission, the RM listing is favourable 
to large asymmetry of information between the various stakeholders involved in the transaction. 
This situation, together with the penny stock characteristics of shell shares and a long history of 
fraud, has given a bad reputation to RM listings.   
Bad  reputation:  In  North  America,  RMs  are  often  associated  with  fraud  by  regulators, 
academics and practitioners.
15 On April 14, 2004, the SEC anno unced it would monitor shell 
companies more aggressively to curb abuses in "backdoor" RMs. Changes in regulatory oversight 
resulted from concerns that  RMs involve shells, where insiders utilize schemes to sell stock to 
unsuspecting  shareholders,  and  then  d ump  the  shares  themselves  (Gleason,  Rosenthal  and 
Wiggins 2005). Some fraud  methods, including  “Boiler Rooms,”  are  often  mentioned in  the 
context of RM, including by the Assistant Manager of Investigations of the Ontario Securities 
Commission (Hubley 2002). In Canada, RMs often use cash shells, that are prone to insiders 
trading (Chen 2000). They are “on average high risk, under-performing ventures, where agency 
problems play an important role, and should therefore be looked upon carefully by potential 
investors”  (Rosenboom  and  Vasconcelos  2009,  p.1).  The  bad  reputation  of  RM  is  partially 
inherited from the blind pools and penny stock experimentations. In Canada, RMs are mainly 
done on capital pools company, and this program is a clone of the U.S. badly perceived Blind 
Pools/Blank-Checks  program  (Heyman  2007).  An  important  implication  of  this  reputational 
effect for our study is that RM firms can be seen as more risky and of lower quality than similar 
IPO firms for a long period of time because the private firms‟ managers have decided to bypass 
the certification associated with the IPO process. Feldman (2009) underlines that winning market 
support is the major challenge for RM firms. Positive announcements by the resulting issuers 
could partially resolve this reputation effect. However, because RM firms are generally at a pre-
revenue stage and will not be profitable before three to five years, the higher cost of capital 
should prevail during a long period of time.     
                                                 
15 A quick search on Factiva (November 5, 2010) using “reverse merger” and “fraud” provided 298 
references  from  1998  to 2010.  For  Molloy  (2006,  p.4): “the  benefits  ascribed  to the reverse  merger 
process are ephemeral at best and (…) the quick entry into the public markets without the discipline of the 
traditional IPO process is hardly beneficial to shareholders.” See also the section 8, entitled “Shady 




We analyze a situation where entrepreneurial ventures enter a stock market. In this context 
of  large  information  asymmetry,  they  can  choose  either  to  use  a  quick,  opaque  and  badly 
perceived listing method or to submit themselves to the strict requirements and time-line of an 
IPO. The first choice implies that the firm offers a non-approved and non-certified disclosure, 
available only after several investment decisions by the shell‟s shareholders and private investors 
have been done. We contend that this choice should influence the firm value at the listing time 
and  firm  long-run  performance.  However,  whichever  the  listing  mode,  public  firms  should 
generally fulfill the same ongoing disclosure requirements.
16 This implies that investors access 
the same set of information for IPO and RM issuers after the listing.  
C. Pricing hypothesis  
According to the rational expectations hypothesis, the poor quality of issuers, their opacity  
and  the  possibility  of  opportunistic  behavior  by  managers  should  be  fully  anticipated  by 
investors. As evidenced by a large literature based on cross listing and changes in listing, firms 
that  submit  themselves  to  a  stricter  regulatory  process,  including  higher  disclosure,  enjoy  a 
decrease in their cost of equity and an increase in their value (Hail and Leuz 2006). A large body 
of theoretical research supports a link between information and the cost of equity (see Healy and 
Palepu 2001 for a review). Another stream of research considers that the cost of equity is higher 
when  the  transaction  costs  and  illiquidity  are  higher.  Because  more  disclosure  increases  the 
liquidity of shares, it also potentially reduces the cost of equity. Following both tracks, the effects 
of disclosure on the cost of capital may be more important when the asymmetry of information is 
large. The disclosure content is not the sole relevant characteristic that impacts the cost of equity. 
The credibility and timeliness of the source of disclosure affect their impact on firm‟s cost of 
equity capital (Kothari, Xu and Short 2009). 
Accordingly, rational investors will associate a higher cost of capital to an opaque firm that 
list using a lax regulated process than to a similar firm that discloses timely information in a 
strictly regulated process. In such a rational world, the prices are set low enough to ensure the 
investors  a  fair  rate  of  return  after  the  listing.  This  mechanism  is  likely  to  be  modified  by 
behavioral considerations if irrational investors influence the pricing. Behavioral explanations are 
                                                 
16 However, venture issuers listed on the TSXV are submitted to smoother disclosure requirements than 




generally proposed to explain the long run underperformance following IPOs  (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist 2001). Behavioral theories assume the presence of “irrational” investors who bid up 
the price of IPO shares beyond their true value. Miller (1977) proposes that the price around the 
time of new listing is set mainly by the most optimistic investors, when short sales strategy 
cannot be implemented as in IPO and RM. Individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases 
when stocks are harder to value and when market-level uncertainty is higher (Kumar 2009). 
Marciukaityte,  Szewczyk  and  Varma.  (2005)  propose  optimism  as  the  main  explanation  for 
underperformance following private placements, because the issuers are generally small, young 
firms with high information asymmetry and too little history to predict their future performance. 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000, p.253) assert that SEO issuers‟ underperformance is largely 
driven by relatively small stocks. Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that the underperformance is 
not an IPO effect, but a characteristic of small, low book-to-market (high-growth) firms. Chou, 
Gombola and Liu (2009) conclude that overall, investors may be overly optimistic about the 
prospects of growth firms.  
In such a context of irrational pricing, we can expect valuation errors to be higher for more 
opaque firms affected by large informational assymetry. According this “overoptimism” effect, 
the stock price should be a positive function of the information asymmetry.  In such a setting, the 
gap between the observed prices and the long run “true” value of a stock depend on the relative 
strength of the cost of capital and of the overoptimism effects. We contend that the cost of capital 
effect is likely to override the overoptimism effect for two main reasons. First, irrational investors 
should be a minority because they are likely to be driven out of the market by poor returns. 
Second, the missing element in the Miller (1977)‟s model is the fact that the overoptimism effect 
should be anticipated and accounted for by the other investors in the market (L'Her and Suret 
1995). This feed-back effect should mitigate the divergence between the rational price and the 
one stated by the optimistic investors. At this stage, higher prices are still expected for IPOs than 
for RM.  
The investors‟ characteristics can mitigate this effect. In theory (and in the U.S.), private 
placements are subscribed by large institutional investors, who can be considered as less prone to 
irrational  behavior.  Indeed,  in  the  U.S.,  although  the  shareholders  not  participating  in  the 
placement experience post-issue negative long-term abnormal returns, the participating investors 




Haushalter  2010).  The  situation  is  very  different  in  Canada,  where  private  placements  are 
generally  subscribed  by  groups  of  individual  investors.  To  illustrate  this  point,  we  carefully 
analyze the characteristics of the providers of private equity in Canada, using a sample of 744 
private  placements  from  2001  to  2005.  We  observe  that  a  very  small  proportion  of  private 
placements are invested by institutional investors (less than 2%) or by people who are important 
shareholders after the placement and can be considered insiders. Even for small placements, we 
observe numerous investors (10 on average) and a significant proportion of 32.39% of the private 
placements had been subscribed by 21 investors or more. The lack of skill and rationality of 
Canadian private equity investors is illustrated by their negative excess returns, even when this 
return is adjusted for the discount (Carpentier, L‟Her and Suret 2010). This allows us to consider 
that investors involved in  private placement surrounding RMs do not  have private access  to 
information, and can be prone to the same irrational behavior than IPO investors.  
In our setting, two opposite effects influence the observed issue price: a cost of capital 
effect that decreases the value of the more risky and opaque firms and an overoptimism bias that 
increases the price of the firms where the information asymmetry is larger. We now turn toward 
the consequence of these two effects on the long run underperformance. 
According to the classical interpretation of the Miller (1977)‟s proposition, the long run 
return will be a negative function of the over optimism bias, because information will drive the 
stock price toward its equilibrium value. This remains true if we consider that the cost of capital 
differences will be erased with time. However, if the difference between the costs of capital 
subsists for a long period of time, the long run performance should be lower for the firm that list 
with the larger asymmetry of information.
17  
D. Regulation, disclosure and valuation 
                                                 
17 Let us illustrate this analysis by a numerical example. Two similar firms with expected cash flow of $10 
list using an IPO and an RM respectively. Rational investors set the cost of capital to 10% for the IPO and 
15% for the RM. The rational values are set to $100 and $66.67 respectively. Optimistic investors add a 
premium of 10% for the IPO and 20% for the RM. If the irrational investors are able to set the issue price, 
the IPO is now worth $110 and the RM $80. We assume now that both costs of capital remain unchanged 
after the listing, due to the bad reputation of the RM firm. Optimistic investors do not influence the price 
on the secondary market. After 3 years, the respective market prices will be $100 and $66.67 respectively 
for the IPO and the RM and the associated raw returns are -10% and -16.7%. In the case where the RM 
firm is able to reduce its cost of equity at the level enjoyed by the IPO firm, both market values are equal 




RM firms are generally at an earlier stage of development and the proportion of firms 
reporting no revenues is larger in this sub sample. They are more opaque (Floros and Shastri 
2009) than IPO firms and constitute real valuation challenges. The asymmetry of information is 
also likely to be larger in the case of RM, for the reasons exposed in the previous section devoted 
to the regulatory dimension. If credible (certified) and timely disclosure indeed reduces the cost 
of equity, then firms that opt for RM listing should have lower value than similar firms that 
choose  to  fully  disclose  using  a  prospectus  and  the  IPO  process,  in  a  world  of  rational 
expectations and pricing.  
According to the Miller‟s (1977) proposition and the behavioral finance literature in the 
particular context of small capitalization, the listing price is set mainly by the most optimistic 
investors. This price diverges from the present value of future cash flows set by the average 
investor (the intrinsic or true value), and the divergence is a function of the heterogeneity of 
expectations.  The  RM  price  should  be  higher  than  the  IPO  price,  everything  being  equal. 
However, the Miller‟s analysis neglects the fact that the future cash-flows are discounted at a 
higher  price,  on  average,  if  the  uncertainty  is  greater.  If  we  consider  this  dimension,  the 
relationship between the price and uncertainty depends on the relative strength of the cost of 
capital  effect,  that  decreases  the  average  price  set  by  rational  investors,  and  the  irrational 
premium set by most optimistic investors. Uncertainty sharply increases the cost of capital, as 
evidenced by the very high rates of 36 to 45%  required by venture capitalists to invest in early 
stage venture (Manigart, Waele, Wright, Robbie, Desbrières, Sapienza and Beekman 2002). We 
expect that the cost of capital effect dominates the irrationality effect and we predict that RM are 
priced lower than IPOs. In other words, we contend that irrational investors can play a role, but 
that rational investors are numerous enough to dominate the effect of irrational investors.  
 
E. Listing method and long-run performance 
The RM choice is likely to increase the cost of equity, and accordingly to depress the stock 
value, during a long time for several reasons. First, RMs have a bad reputation and the lack of 
reputable intermediaries is likely to give the investors a limited trust in RM firms, as in the case 
of direct public offerings (Trainor 2003). Anand and Johnson (2006 p.6) report that both firms 




offer toward a death spiral. They underline the pivotal role of underwriter to certify the value of 
the issue. Feldman (2009 p.89) contends that winning market support is crucial for RM firms, 
because “some suggest that reverse mergers, special purpose acquisition companies and others 
alternatives to IPOs simply are not viable because the post trading in the stock is often weak and 
subject  to  manipulation.”  Second,  in  Canada,  IPO  and,  in  a  larger  extent  RM  firms  can  be 
considered as start-ups. Given their limited operating history, such firms are arguably the most 
opaque firms in the economy (Cassar 2004). As IPO firms, RM firms should comply with the 
ongoing disclosure requirement. However, RM firms have generally a very limited stream of new 
and positive information to report following the listing. On average, the proportion of RM firms 
reporting no revenues or negative earnings increases during the years following the listing.
18 
Third, RMs rely on private placement. According to Ou and Haynes  (2006, p.158), the private 
equity  market  “often  involves  rather  complex  contracts  that  are  informationally  opaque  and 
contrasts significantly from the more informationally transparent public stock (…) markets.” In 
such a context, the reputational effect of the listing choice is likely to increase the cost of equity 
for a long period of time.  
If valuation errors are larger for RMs than for IPOs and if the cost of capital effect persists 
in the long run, one should expect lower long run returns for RM than for IPOs, despite the fact 
that IPO prices are higher than corresponding RM prices at the listing time.  
 
 
F. Testable propositions 
We  specifically  test  the  following  two  propositions:  First,  if  prospectus  disclosure, 
credibility and timeliness is more informative than the shady RM process, then IPOs incur a 
lower cost of capital than RM listed firms and experience a higher valuation.  
                                                 
18  The analysis of the post-RM operating performance confirms this proposition. During the third fiscal 
year after the listing, the proportion of surviving RMs firm without revenue had slightly increased from 
30.22% for the listing year to 33%. The proportion of negative earnings has increased from 71.85% to 




Second, if the choice of the RM listing method increases the cost of capital in the long run 
and induces larger valuation error linked with asymmetry and heterogeneity of expectations, then 
IPOs exhibit better long-term performance than RM.  
Our  empirical  tests  extend  the  previous  literature  by  providing  new  analyses  of  full 
disclosure listings, including a prospectus and a structured process monitored by the securities 
commission (in the case of IPOs), and a less structured and less certified process essentially 
monitored by the  exchange  (in the case of RMs). We account  for the  fact  that performance 
differences between IPOs and RMs are not solely attributable to the disclosure effect. First, in the 
case of IPOs, prestigious investment bankers or venture capitalists can also be involved, while 
they are absent in RM listing. These reputational intermediaries can influence the pricing and the 
long-run  performance  of  newly  listed  companies.  We  control  for  the  involvement  of  such 
intermediaries in the robustness check on our results. Second, an IPO gives rise to a more liquid 
secondary market for the stocks than an RM, and the illiquidity discount thus negatively affects 
RM pricing. We implicitly control for the liquidity by including the firm size in the various 
models. Third, we consider that the TSXV is a less liquid market than the senior exchange, the 
TSX.  We  test  for  the  robustness  of  our  model  to  the  inclusion  of  a  dummy  variable  to 
differentiate the firms listed on both markets. Fourth, RM firms rely on private equity. Private 
placement investors generally are considered as well informed and knowledgeable. However, in 
Canada,  the  small  size  of  the  private  placements  linked  to  RM  listing  prevents  institutional 
investors from being significantly involved in these transactions.   
In  the  following  sections,  we  test  these  two  propositions  in  the  Canadian  context.  We 
control for differences among IPOs and RMs with an extremely detailed dataset that is described 




III. Data and Stylized Facts 
A. Data sources 
We use a hand-collected sample of new listings on the TSX and TSXV (and its predecessor 




and IPOs, and consider performance data to December 2006 before the financial crisis. We do not 
consider the IPOs of Capital Pool Companies
19 (CPCs) when these entities simply collect some 
cash, but we consider all the Qualifying Transactions (QTs) that enable a closed operating 
corporation to list on the  exchange.
20 We collected the lists of IPOs from FPInfomart.ca. We 
exclude IPOs resulting from the creation of income trusts, because they are essentially the 
continuation, in another form, of a previously existing public firm. We also exclude the few cases 
of privatization of state -owned firms and demutualizations, for similar reasons. We detected 
1,024 IPOs from 1993 to 2003. Prospectuses are available in SEDAR since 1997.
21 We obtain 
those of earlier years from the Autorité des Marchés Financiers du Québec, investment bankers, 
and academic libraries in several provinces. We took the remaining accounting information from 
old versions of Thomson‟s Cancorp Financials (the accounting database).  
To compile the RM data, we used four sources. First, these operations were systematically 
reported by the TSXV review from 2001. Second, for the earlier years, we used a keyword scan, 
programmed on the accounting database, to detect each mention of a RM or reverse takeover in 
financial statements and notes. Third, we scanned the stock market database (Datastream) to track 
the typical pattern of shells involved in an RM: a penny stock increases sharply in value for a few 
months before a trade suspension, and trading generally restarts under a new symbol.  Finally, we 
scanned the Canadian business newspaper databases (via Factiva and Eureka.cc) to identify all 
RM  announcements.  We  then  cross-checked  these  sources  and  analyzed  each  transaction  to 
confirm  that  the  detected  cases  indeed  consisted  of  RMs  associated  with  new  listings.    To 
compile a list of the CPCs, we used the new issues published by Financial Post and searched the 
Exchange  reviews  and  SEDAR  to  determine  whether  the  new  issue  was  a  CPC.  QTs  were 
identified for each CPC using the TSX Web site, along with SEDAR, the Survey of Predecessor 
                                                 
19 A CPC is a shell company listing with a number of restrictions.  These restrictions are described on the 
TSX  webpage:  http://www.tsx.com/en/listings/listing_with_us/ways/capital_company.html.  See  also 
Carpentier and Suret (2006).  
20 On the AIM, the Investment Companies can be considered equivalent to the CPCs, although they should 
raise a minimum equivalent to CAN$6 million, against CAN$300,000 for CPCs. In the U.S., the  Special 
Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) play a similar role, but for larger transactions (Berger 2008) 
21  SEDAR,  the  Canadian  equivalent  of  the  U.S.  EDGAR,  was  implemented  in  1997.  See 




and Defunct Companies published by the Financial Post, Lexis-Nexis, and Internet browsers.
22  
We detected 1,384 RMs from 1993 to 2003.  We collected the main characteristics of the entrant 
firm from the accounting database and SEDAR.  
Often, firms use backdoor listing methods to access the market without issuing equity, or 
they  delay  the  offering  for  several  weeks  or  months.  Using  SEDAR  since  1997  and 
FPinfomart.ca for the earlier years, we analyzed each transaction to det ermine the amounts 
collected around the time of listing.  We consider that financing is associated with a backdoor 
listing if it occurs during the 12 months following the listing.  
In Canada, there is no equivalent to the CRSP delisting codes. Therefore, we hand checked 
the status of all the issues as of June 30, 2007.  For each of the delisted stocks, we identified the 
approximate date of delisting, the reason for, and the exact circumstances of the delisting.  Our 
information came from the TSX Web site, S EDAR, FPinfomart.ca, the securities commissions‟ 
cease  trade  orders,  Factiva,  and  research  tools  on  the  internet.  The  data  allow  for  a  correct 
treatment of the last returns for each truncated stream of returns. There are frequently incomplete 
series because of the high delisting rates of the small issuers we study. However, the incomplete 
series cannot be deleted if one expects to limit the survival bias. 
We summarize the population (Panel A) and the final sample (Panel B) in Table 1. We 
reduced the sample to the observations for which complete data are available at the listing time 
and whose returns can be estimated during the 36 months following the listing. Panel A illustrates 
the growing popularity of RM listing in Canada.  For the entire period, we observe 1.35 RM for 
each IPO. However, since 1998, this ratio has reached 2.33 (804 RMs against 345 IPOs). The 
growing popularity of RMs as a listing tool reinforces our interest in the present study. The 
amounts of money collected in both types of listing are in the same range: the median IPO gross 
proceeds are CAN$2.48 million and the median private placements occurring during RM are 
CAN$1.1  million.  Both  are  very  small  relative  to  the  U.S.  criteria.  Gleason,  Rosenthal  and 
Wiggins (2005) report a median transaction value of US$31 million for their 121 RMs. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
                                                 
22 The rules of the program required that a CPC completes its QT in the 18 months following its creation. 
In 2001, the rules governing the program changed, to allow the QT to involve a public firm. In such cases, 





Panel B reports the number and characteristics of the final sample. The missing values 
reduce  the  number  of  IPOs  from  1,024  to  684.  The  final  sample  represents  66.8%  of  the 
population.  The  corresponding  number  is  55.7%  for  the  RMs,  because  the  collection  of 
accounting data is generally more difficult for them because of the lower disclosure level. The 
missing observations increase the median gross proceeds of IPOs from 2.48 to 3.51, indicating 
that we lost the smaller issuers. No such effect is detected for RM. In the population, as in the 
sample, the large difference between median and mean amounts collected at the listing time 
indicates that a few very large transactions are included together with a large number of very 
small placements.  
B. Valuation Metrics 
We  follow  the  strategy  of  Kim  and  Ritter  (1999)  and  Purnanandam  and  Swaminathan 
(2004) who respectively analyze the IPO‟s valuation at the prospectus and at the market prices, 
based  on  the  common  multiple  of  sales,  earnings,  or  book  values.  This  method  requires  an 
estimation of the multiples for each company in the sample, and then expressing this multiple 
relative to a benchmark. 
The IPO value is given by Vi= Offer pricei x Shares outstandingi,t0 where the number of 
shares outstanding is estimated at the end of the year of the issue (t0). If an RM is part of a 
private placement, then we use the price per share of the private placement, and our estimation is 
similar to the case of an IPO. This is in line with the literature (Dai 2007).   
When the RM occurs without a private placement, we use the first market value available 
after the RM to substitute for the unobservable offer price. Because we consider the total number 
of shares of the resulting firm, our estimated value reflects the combined value of the entrant; that 
is, the shell plus the private placement (the value of Result inc in Figure 1). To be consistent in 
the estimation of valuation ratios, we also consider the total revenues and earnings of the entrant, 
plus those of the shell, as follows.   
Revenues,  earnings,  and  shareholders‟  equity  are  estimated  at  the  closing  of  the  year 
preceding  the  listing.  For  RMs  where  the  financial  statements  of  the  private  entity  are  not 
available, we infer the accounting number of the entrant firm from the consolidated financial 
statements for the year including the RM as follows:  




REV t-1 = REV t0 – REV of shell t-1, with REV = Total revenues 
SE t-1 = SE t0 – SE of shell t-1 – EARN t0, with SE = shareholders‟ equity. 
We include the book-to-price ratio, to obviate the lack of positive earnings, and even of 
sales in a large proportion of the sample. We define the raw valuation metrics of a firm i as 
follows:  
S/Pi = REVi  / (Offer Pricei x SOi)  
E/Pi = EARNi  / (Offer Pricei x SOi)  
B/Pi = PSEi / (Offer Pricei x SOi)  
With SO = shares outstanding after listing 
REV = Total revenues before listing 
EARN = total earnings before listing 
PSE = Post-money Shareholders‟ equity 
We estimate the comparable values for the universe of the Canadian listed firms included in 
the successive versions of the accounting database, using the market value at the end of each 
month. Then we set up three groups by size based on total assets, and we split the population 
according to 2-digit SIC codes. Then, we further split the sample according to profitability, as in 
Bhojraj and Lee (2002), indicating that considering the profitability of comparables will improve 
the accuracy of relative valuation models. The relative valuation ratio for a firm i is given by the 
raw valuation metric of the firm i divided by size/sector/profitability median valuation metric for 
the listing month and the two preceding months.
23 For example, relative E/PIPO = E/PIPO / E/PComp 
where E/PComp stands for the median ratio of comparable firms. All statistics and models are 
presented for relative valuation metrics. 
C. Stylized facts 
In Table 2, we report the main characteristics of the samples of IPOs and RM listings, along 
the median characteristics generally used in the analysis of the IPOs. The gross proceeds and the 
pre-listing shareholders‟ equity indicate that both types of listing mainly involve tiny capitalized 
stocks, with a few exceptions that explain the large differences between medians and means. The 
shareholders‟ equity is CAN$400,000 before RMs and CAN$1.19 million before the IPOs. The 
RMs have a median private placement of CAN$1 million, and the IPO median gross proceeds are 
CAN$3.51 million. The difference between these two groups of listing is statistically significant.  
                                                 
23  We  include  three  months  in  the  estimation  of  the  median  ratio  to  circumvent  the  low  number  of 




RM  listed  firms  are  younger  than  IPOs:  6.07  years  vs.  9.81.  Both  groups  report  very  small 
median revenues of CAN$200,000 (RMs) and CAN$880,000 (IPOs).  The proportion of newly 
listed  firms  reporting  negative  earnings  before  the  listing  for  RMs  and  IPOs  is  71.85%  and 
59.94%, respectively. Both groups are financially constrained and, without the cash injection, 
they would have negative cash after the listing.   
The last three rows of Panel A report the relative valuation metrics. These valuation ratios 
are estimated by dividing the value indicator by the price (E/P), which is then expressed relative 
to their comparable. As a consequence, a low value of this metric indicates that the firms we 
analyzed  are  valued  more  highly  than  their  peers.  For  earnings-  and  sales-based  ratios,  the 
median is in the vicinity of 50%. This indicates that the median newly listed firm is valued much 
more  highly  (by  approximately  two  times)  than  firms  similar  in  terms  of  sector,  size,  and 
profitability. This finding also indicates that, for a large proportion of our sample, the valuations 
are optimistic. The valuation appears to be higher for RMs than for IPOs, but this result should be 
analyzed  cautiously,  because  the  other  characteristics  of  the  issuers  are  not  accounted  for. 
However, the mean ratios are higher than 1. This indicates that, on average, newly listed firms are 
valued less highly than comparable non-issuers. The large difference between the mean and the 
median indicates that the distribution of the valuation metrics is skewed.    
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Panel B reports tests and comparisons for the dummy variables. The proportion of new 
listings that report no revenue is similar in the two groups, around 30%. We also report the 
proportion of firms reporting revenues but negative earnings.  It reaches 44.49% in the RM group 
vs. 30.26% in the IPO group.  Both types of listing seem to be used by emerging firms, but the 
RM listing attracts a larger proportion of loss reporting firms than the IPO. 
The proportion of IPOs and RMs observed in the High-Tech and Materials-and-Energy 
sectors is similar. Many of the RM-listed firms (35.67%) are audited by one of the Big Five 
(Four) auditors.  This is truer in the case of IPOs (44.01%), and the difference between the groups 
is significant. It is surprising to observe such high involvement of prestigious auditors in very 
small and generally still developing firms. The pre-listing market returns are significantly higher 
in the case of IPOs than RMs; this is in line with the link between public equity issuance and 





A. Self-selection Problem 
There is a self-selection problem in the choice of RMs and IPOs. This choice should be 
explained by the managers‟ long-run objectives (an unobservable set of variables) together with 
an observable set of variables. If managers want to develop the firm, they should consider listing 
through an IPO, which provides a more liquid market and potentially reduces the cost of equity 
because of the higher level of disclosure.  If the managers‟ objective is to disinvest, or if they 
want to maintain a large degree of control over the public firm, then they will put less emphasis 
on these considerations and will prefer the RM listing option. Moreover, several exogenous and 
endogenous variables also can explain the choice. For example, IPOs can be easier and more 
frequent in hot issue markets. An RM would be the optimal choice if the required amount of 
money were small. The managers‟ objective is unobservable. 
We use the two-stage procedure of Heckman (1979) to estimate the self-selection model 
(similar to that used in closely related contexts; see, e.g., Choi 2007; Choi, Nelson and Pritchard 
2009). In the first stage, consistent estimates are obtained from a probit regression of the dummy 
variable DIPOi, that equals 1 if the company i lists after an IPO, and 0 otherwise, on Zi, a vector 
of explanatory variables.  These estimates are used to compute the inverse Mills ratios (IMR), λ0i.  
Then, in the second stage, the long-run returns and valuation equations are estimated by OLS 
with the IMR included as an additional explanatory variable (Heckman‟s  Lambda), which is 
implemented using SAS where both subsequent outcomes are observable.  Our self-selection 
model is given by:  
DIPOi = a1 + a2 DHTi + a3 DNRi + a4 DOGi + a5 LogAsseti + a6 Rm12m1i + a7 DNEi + a8 Pre 
B/Mi + ui  (1) 
This model is based on the general idea that better companies opt for the most stringent 
listing mode, to signal their quality, and to create the favorable conditions for future growth.
24  
                                                 
24 Professionals present the RM listings‟ advantage (through the CPC program) as follows: (1) provides 
alternative access to capital when the firm is at too early a stage for a broadly distributed regular IPO, or 
the IPO market is not strong enough in general; (2) VC financing is not viable or management prefers not 
to use; (3) desire for a transaction that can retain higher ownership; (4) time to be a public firm; (5) greater 
flexibility, certainty, and control in the going-public process; and (6) going public transaction costs are 




This  relation  between  disclosure  and  future  growth  is  evidenced  by  Hyytinen  and  Pajarinen 
(2005), who observe that firms in need of external finance voluntarily look for good disclosure 
quality.  Sjostrom  (2008 p.8) writes that in  general  only lower quality  firms  undertake RMs, 
because more attractive financing options are available to higher quality firms. Hence, going 
public through an RM signals to the market that the firm has probably been passed over by 
underwriters and is therefore of low quality.  Moreover, we consider that the choice of the listing 
mode can be linked to the industry.  As an example, the mining sector has a long tradition of RM, 
and the CPC program was initiated in the provinces where the Oil-and-Gas and mineral sectors 
are important. We include three dummy variables (DHTi, DNRi, and DOGi) that take the value 1 
if  the  firm  belongs  to  the  Technology,  Natural  resources  (Mineral),  and  Oil-and-Gas  sector, 
respectively. The other firms fall into disparate activity sectors. We consider that the level of 
asymmetry is decreasing with firm size. We control for size by including the natural logarithm of 
pre-listing total assets (LogAsseti). The lack of positive earnings is the primary indicator of a 
low-quality issuer. We control for this dimension by including DNEi, a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the issuing firm reports negative earnings before the listing.  We consider that negative 
earnings are also a proxy for the heterogeneity of the expectation and information asymmetry.  
The probability of public firms issuing private over public securities is positively related to the 
measures of asymmetric information (Gomes and Phillips 2007) 
The choice of a RM listing implies that the secondary market for stocks will be less liquid 
than after an  IPO, although in  the Canadian case the differences  are likely to  be small. We 
propose that the firms will use an IPO listing more frequently when they have more growth 
opportunities. We use the classical measure for the relative weight of the growth opportunities, 
the book-to-market ratio. We estimate this ratio before the listing to avoid capturing a post-listing 
valuation effect. Pre B/M is estimated by dividing the shareholders‟ equity at the end of the 
previous fiscal year by the simultaneous market value.
25 A high value of this ratio indicates a lack 
of growth opportunities. We expect a negative association between this ratio and the choice of an 
IPO. Firms are more likely to issue public equity than private equity when the market conditions 
                                                                                                                                                              
2006,  presented  by:  Sean  D.  Caulfeild.  Perley-Robertson,  Hill  &  McDougall  LLP, 
http://www.ocri.ca/events/presentations/dollars_sense/nov062.pdf 
25 When the shareholders‟ equity at t-1 (SEt-1) was not available, we infer this value with the following 
expression: SE t-1 = SE0 – GP – EARN0, where GP and EARN stands for the gross proceeds of the IPO or 




appear to be favorable (Gomes and Phillips 2007) We estimate this dimension by the market 
return during the 12 months preceding the listing (Rm12m1i). 
The constraint level and the age also can explain the choice of the listing mode, but they 
cannot be estimated for a sizeable part of our sample of RMs. Accordingly, we cannot use these 
variables for the whole study. However, we report the results for the sub-sample in Table 3.    
Heavily constrained firms are of lower quality and they need cash rapidly. Using an RM can 
provide cash more rapidly than using an IPO. However, doing an IPO can be difficult for a 
distressed  firm.  For  each  firm,  we  estimate  the  financial  constraint  indicator  proposed  by 
DeAngelo, De Angelo, and Stulz: pro forma cash/TAi= [cash, deposit, and short-term investment 
in year 1, less the gross proceeds of the issue] divided by the total assets in year 1. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
Based on previous U.S. evidence, we consider that the choice of an IPO is more likely when 
the  firms  are  larger,  of  better  quality  (reporting  positive  earnings),  have  superior  growth 
opportunities, and when the market is more favorable to the IPO.  Because of the high pricing for 
high-tech stocks that prevailed during a large part of the studied period, we suggest that there will 
be more IPOs in this sector. Table 3 summarizes the results of the model of choice used to 
control for the self-selection problem. The model is highly significant.  All of the variables have 
the expected sign, except for the DNR dummy.  The probability of the choice of an IPO is higher 
in this sector, a result that can be traced to the very good performance of this sub-sector in the 
stock market, in line with the increasing price of natural resources since 2000.  
B. Relative Valuation Metrics 
Our main hypothesis is that the choice of the listing mode influences the cost of equity. A 
firm should be valued more, all else being equal, when the listing follows an IPO rather than an 
RM.  We analyze the valuation as stated by the investment bankers (in the case of IPOs) or by the 
private investors (in the case of RMs).  Then, our logic is more in line with Kim and Ritter (1999) 
than with Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) who explain the market price following the 
IPOs. Using ordinary least-squares regressions, we explain the relative valuation metrics by the 
listing choice (DIPO) and by several control variables. The most important of these variables is 
the choice of a prestigious auditor (PAUDIT): it takes a value of 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 




valuation,  above  and  beyond  the  effect  of  the  listing  mode.  We  include  additional  control 
variables to consider two dimensions:  the first is risk -- larger firms and those with positive 
earnings should obtain higher multiples, because they constitute less risky investments. All else 
equal,  the  required  cost  of  equity  should  be  lower.  Second  is  sector:  the  accounting  rules 
governing R&D reporting, such as the ones related to resource companies, are likely to influence 
the earnings and book values of the firms in these sectors. We can expect to observe systematic 
differences between the valuations in these different sectors. Moreover, the expectations of future 
revenues also may have systematically influenced market values. We control for the return of the 
market during the year preceding the listing to consider the potential effect of timing. We can 
expect higher values following the periods of rally in the market. To handle the self-selection 
problem previously discussed, we add the Heckman‟s lambda estimated in the probit model. This 
variable controls for the unobservable factors that influence the choice of the listing mode. 
C. Long-run Return Estimates 
The analysis of long-run returns is a complex empirical problem, particularly for penny 
stocks, whose distribution of returns is highly influenced by a few extremely high returns. The 
estimation of abnormal returns in such situations calls for particular care. Mainly, the test based 
on averages could have low predictive power because returns are strongly influenced by the right 
tail of the distribution.
26 As a first step, we estimate the raw geometric returns for each issuer, for 
the 36 months following the issue. These returns are neither adjusted for the market nor for other 
factors like size and risk. However, in the area of very small capitalization, the adjustments 
allowing for estimation of excess return could produce significant noise, and the analysis of raw 
returns is of interest. 
As a second step, we estimate abnormal returns using the event-time methodology (BHAR, 
namely  the  investor‟s  experience  measure).  These  returns  are  estimated  against  reference 
portfolios composed of firms of comparable size and book-to-market ratios.
27 To construct the 
                                                 
26  The  estimation  of  excess  returns  can  also  be  complicated,  because  the  returns  on  the  benchmark 
portfolios, also composed of small capitalized stocks, can be heavily skewed. This is why we analyze the 
raw returns together with the excess returns. We cannot use accounting measures of performance because 
the majority of our firms report negative earnings.  
27 Several authors use control-firm benchmarks in lieu of, or in complement to, the portfolio benchmark. 




reference portfolios, we extract Canadian firms‟ book-equity from the accounting database and 
estimate the book-to-market ratios after matching the stock market and accounting databases. To 
construct the size-control portfolio, we ranked all Canadian stocks each month according to their 
market capitalization, and formed three portfolios. Independently, all Canadian stocks also are 
ranked according to their book-to-market ratios, and three portfolios are formed. The returns on 
the  nine-monthly  rebalanced  portfolios  are  calculated  as  the  value-weighted  average  of  the 
individual-firm monthly returns in each of the size/book-to-market intersections. Each RM firm 
then is assigned a control portfolio based on its market capitalization and book-to-market ratio 
over the performance test period examined. BHARs are based on the calculation of the average 
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Thus, BHARs measure the average multiyear returns from a strategy of investing in all 
Canadian  RM  listed  firms,  and  selling  at  the  end  of  a  particular  holding  period,  versus  a 
comparable strategy using a benchmark (Rbi). We estimate equally-weighted (EW) and value-
weighted  (VW)  portfolio  returns.  We  use  both  weighting  schemes  to  override  the  problem 
induced by the distribution of market capitalizations. The VW results could be largely influenced 




A. Listing mode and valuation 
Table  4  presents  the  results  of  the  model  that  explain  the  relative  valuation  by  the 
listing/disclosure choice and control variables. Each model is estimated with and without the 
                                                                                                                                                              
firms at an early development stage, and with a limited life expectation. The choice of a control firm could 
lead to random results, in the case of delisting and when the returns reach extreme values. 
28 We also estimate the abnormal returns through the alphas obtained from the Fama and French‟s (1993) 
three factor pricing model (TFPM). This method is highly sensitive to skweness, though, and we do not 




Heckman‟s  Lambda  as  a  control  for  self-selection.  We  express  the  valuation  metrics  in  the 
opposite of the conventional way (earnings-to-price ratio, rather than price-to-earnings ratio, for 
example) to overcome the problem of a very low value indicator in numerous cases. Accordingly, 
we  expect  negative  signs  for  the  DIPO  and  PAUDIT  dummy  variables,  which  indicate 
respectively that the firm had fulfilled the disclosure and registration requirement to get listed, 
and that a prestigious auditor was hired before the listing.  
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
The firms that list after an IPO get higher relative valuation, in each of the valuation metrics 
we  analyze.  The  effect  is  statistically  and  economically  significant.  We  can  interpret  the 
coefficient of the dummy variable DIPO, which is -1.36 in the case of the relative earnings to 
price, as follows: the difference between the firms choosing IPO versus RM, when the other 
factors are considered as constant, is -1.36. The average relative ratio is in the vicinity of 1.24 for 
IPOs (Table 2). The relative ratio should be approximately 2.60 for RM to get a difference of -
1.36. If the price / earnings ratio for a comparable group of non-issuers is 10, then E/PComp = 0.10 
and E/PIPO and E/PRM are 0.124 and 0.26, respectively (Rel E/PIPO = 1.24 = 0.124 / 0.10). Under 
this  plausible  hypothesis,  the  average  P/E  is  8.06  and  3.85  for  IPOs  and  RM,  respectively. 
Accordingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable indicates that the IPO choice increases the 
value obtained around the listing by two, for a given level of earnings. The coefficients are -1.18 
for the relative sale-to-price ratio and -1.81 for the book-to-price ratio. According to all valuation 
metrics, the IPO choice significantly increases the valuation, relative to the RM process. The 
investment bankers and private equity investors who price the shares around the listing time seem 
to incorporate the choice of listing mode in their valuation. 
We observe a positive and significant relationship between the relative valuation metrics 
and size, when value is estimated relative to sales and earnings. This indicates that the smaller 
issuers receive a better valuation than the larger firms. This result contradicts the argument that 
larger firms benefit from a lower cost of equity, which in turn provides them a higher valuation. 
Our sample includes a number of very small issuers: in the restricted group for which we can 
estimate the relative sales-to-price ratio, more than 10% of the observations report total assets 
below CAN$1 million. These companies also report very low revenues and earnings. In Table 2, 
we observe that the pricing is, at the median, very high relative to the benchmark, indicating 




the higher and lower values of the relative valuation metrics, by trimming the extreme percentile 
of the distributions. We also verify whether the results hold in each of the two groups of newly 
listed companies. The results are robust and indicate that the over-pricing is more frequent among 
small issuers than the larger ones.   
B. Listing Mode and Long-run Returns 
In  Table  5,  we  illustrate  the  distributions  of  raw  and  abnormal  returns.  Raw  returns 
culminate at 3200% for three years, and 1% of the distribution exhibits returns higher than 890%.  
However, only 10% of the distribution is higher than 167% (39% per year).
29  Using BHAR does 
not eliminate the skewness, although the negative tail does increase. We then observe that the 
distributions of long-run returns  exhibit a high level of skewness. This situation limits the 
possibility of inferring significant differences using methods that essentially rely on average 
effects, like the portfolio approach of the TFPM. Moreover, such distributions violate the basic 
assumptions of the OLS method. We deal with this by discussing and comparing the medians in 
the univariate comparisons, and we use the log transformation (Ln return = Natural logarithm of 
1000% + buy-and-hold or raw returns) to normalize abnormal returns in the OLS estimations. We 
get similar results by trimming the distributions at the 99
th percentile. The results are reported 
with this last method. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
Globally,  the  long-run  returns  following  Canadian  IPOs  and  listings  through  RMs  are 
extremely poor, and are lower for RM than for IPOs. Overall, we estimate the average abnormal 
return to -58.75%, but the median of the distribution of abnormal returns is -86.75%.  The long-
run  underperformance  following  IPOs  is  well  documented  (Jenkinson  and  Ljungqvist  2001, 
Table 2.2).  However, previous evidence situates generally this abnormal return in the vicinity of 
-30%  in  the  U.S.  The  very  negative  values  estimated  in  our  study  are  consistent  with  the 
proposition that lax regulatory requirements induce low quality firm to list on the market. This 
indicates that lowering the initial listing requirements initiated by the Canadian exchanges and 
regulators has negative effects on shareholders‟ wealth. An open question remains to understand 
                                                 
29 We carefully analyze each case where the raw returns exceed 200% to detect and correct the possible 
errors. The reported huge returns are true returns, generally observed for firms initially traded at prices 




why rational investors still participate in such poor quality issues. We observe in Table 5 that few 
newly listed firms produce huge returns, which is attributable to the very low issue prices on 
average. The distribution of returns is consistent with the “lottery stocks” explanation provided 
by authors like Barberis and Huang (2009). In contrast to the prediction of a standard expected 
utility  model,  a  security's  own  skewness  can  be  priced:  a  positively  skewed  security  can  be 
overpriced,  and  can  earn  a  negative  average  excess  return.  Positive  skewness  of  the  returns 
distribution means that, in a few cases, the shareholders can obtain very high rates of return even 
if, on average, the expected return is low.   
Table 6 presents the analysis of the effect of the listing choice on the mean and median 
abnormal returns (Panel A) and on the TFPM alphas (Panel B). In the first part of Panel A, we 
report the mean and median of the distributions of returns, first for the population and then for the 
two sub-samples. We test for the significance of the differences in mean and median. Because the 
distributions  of the raw and abnormal  returns are so  heavily skewed,  we mainly discuss  the 
median  and  their  differences.  We  observe  strong  and  statistically  significant  effects  of  the 
listing/disclosure choice on the raw and abnormal returns. The median raw return is -31.76% for 
3  years  for  IPOs  and  -54.08%  for  RM,  and  the  difference  is  statistically  significant. 
Benchmarking  against  reference  portfolios  increases  this  difference  between  the  two  sub-
samples. The median abnormal return reaches -70.81 % for the IPOs but falls to -103.78% for 
RMs.  Such a result indicates that, for half of the sample, the investment in post-RM listed firms 
is equal to a total opportunity loss. In Panel B, we do not observe significant differences between 
the median of alphas, but the means do differ. This first analysis indicates a significant effect of 
the listing/disclosure choice on the long-run performance of newly listed companies.
30 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
Table 7 presents the results of the models explaining the different measures of long -run 
performance. Each model is estimated with and without the Heckman‟s Lambda for controlling 
for  the  self-selection  problem.  The  first  noticeable  effect  is  the  significant  influence  of  the 
listing/disclosure mode on raw and BHAR returns, even when we control for the dimensions 
generally associated with risk and uncertainty. In both cases, the effect is positive, indicating that 
                                                 
30 To control for the bubble period, we omitted the 200 listings occurring from 1997 (January) to 2001 




IPO listed-firms perform better (less badly) than those that use backdoor listing. BHRE is 17.9% 
higher and BHAR is 33.9% higher for IPO listings.  
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
C. Additional Variables and Robustness Checks 
We  also  considered  additional  robustness  checks.  First,  we  re-ran  regressions  for  the 
subsample of RMs and IPOs separately. We do not report the results for the valuation models, 
where we do not observe any significant effect. This reinforces the previous results, indicating 
that the only significant variable that affects the value at the listing time is the disclosure level. 
We report the results  of the  returns models  in  Table 8. The effect  of a  reputable auditor is 
significant only in the subsample for IPOs, not for the subsample of RMs. For IPOs, BHRE is 
18.5% higher, and BHAR is 24.8% higher when there is a reputable auditor. This indicates that 
hiring a reputable auditor contributes to setting a more reasonable price in the secondary market. 
Such a result is consistent with the proposition that the reputable auditors reduce the asymmetry 
of information and the associated heterogeneity of expectations. From a practical point of view, 
this  result  indicates  that  investors  are  less  negatively  affected  by  investing  in  IPOs  when 
reputable auditors are involved in the issue. Because reasonable performance of the stock on the 
secondary market also is of interest for the newly listed firm seeking a seasoned offering, this 
constitutes  a  complementary  benefit  of  hiring  a  reputable  auditor.  We  do  not  observe  any 
significant effect in the case of RMs. This finding is consistent with the fact that, when the 
disclosure level is low, the certification of this disclosure has both a limited interest and effect. In 
view of this new evidence, it is puzzling that so many RM listed companies hire prestigious 
auditors; one plausible explanation might be that private investors requested such intermediaries.  
Second,  we  considered  additional  variables  in  the  subsample  regressions  for  IPOs  and 
acquisitions in order to control for factors that can influence the relative performance or valuation 
of IPOs and RMs. The results also are reported in  Table 8. First, we included variables for 
venture capital backing (VBIPO)
31 and investment banker reputation (PUND) for the subsample 
                                                 
31 VBIPO is defined as equal to one when the IPO is backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. 
We obtained a list of VC-backed-IPOs from Thomson Financial VC Reporter, for the years 1997, and 
1999  to  2003.  For  the  other  years,  we  analyze  the  list  of  important  shareholders  in  each  of  the 
prospectuses. We compile a list of VCs operating in Canada from 1993 to 2003 from the lists of the 




of IPOs (those variables could not be included for the subsample of RMs given they do not apply 
to RMs).
32 We also considered the exchange listing for both samples (DEXCH is 1 if the firm 
lists on the TSX); however, almost all RMs listed on the TSXV and not on the TSX. This 
variable controls for a possible liquidity effect.  The important finding is that the inclusion of 
these variables does not change the previous results.   
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
VI. Conclusion 
We analyze three dimensions of the new listing process that can roughly be associated with 
the three main stakeholders of new listings:  the regulators, the firms, and the investors. We 
exploit  a  particular  situation  where  the  firm  can  list  under  a  timely  and  certified  disclosure 
process or using backdoor listing methods, where the disclosure is neither certified nor analyzed 
by the securities commission nor available before the conclusion of the main financings. Because 
several cases of frauds, manipulation and assertion of insider tradings occurred in the past, RMs 
suffer  from  a  bad  reputation.  This  context  is  of  particular  interest  because  the  low  listing 
requirements that prevail in Canada allow for the listing of emerging companies that are reporting 
negative earnings  or even no revenues at  all.  This  creates a situation where the information 
asymmetry is very pronounced, and where the role of timely disclosure, securities commission 
monitoring, and certification can be seen more easily than in the highly regulated U.S. context. 
Overall, our assessment is that low listing requirements negatively affect investor wealth. 
The long-run returns that follow Canadian IPOs and RM listings are extremely poor. However, 
this effect can be accounted for by focusing on the average of the distributions. A few newly 
listed firms produce huge returns, but the proportion of negative raw or excess returns can reach 
60% to 70% depending on the measure. The assessment that a higher initial listing requirement 
                                                                                                                                                              
provided by M. Volker at http://www.sfu.ca/~mvolker/biz/moneylnk.htm. Then, we identify each case 
where a VC was involved in the company before the IPO. 
32 Following Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), we consider the most active investment bankers in Canada to 
be prestigious. During the period under study, seven investment bankers subscribed to 60% of a ll the 
initial  and  seasoned  equity  issues,  and  are  thus  considered  prestigious.  No  other  Canadian -based 
investment bank comprises more than 5% of the total market. We also consider as prestigious U .S. firms 
with a score higher than 7 in Carter, Dark, and Singh and  the most active investment bankers worldwide 
provided by Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003 Table 2, p. 73). The dummy variable PUND is one 




will protect the investors seems to be confirmed. A preference for skewness can explain why the 
investors still participate in these offerings which resemble lottery stocks. 
The second dimension we analyze is of interest for both the managers and for research on 
the  economic  effect  of  stricter  oversight.  We  evidence  a  strong  effect  of  the  choice  of 
disclosure/listing mode on the value that the firms can obtain for the new shares issued during the 
listing. In terms of the earnings, the multiple obtained through an IPO is twice the multiple 
observed in an RM situation. We carefully control for the other dimensions that can influence the 
valuation, including self-selection between the two listing modes, in order to carefully assess the 
observed effect associated with the disclosure level. 
The third dimension we analyze is more related to the investors. The important question is 
whether,  all  else  being  equal,  investing  in  firms  that  list  with  full  disclosure  is  better  than 
investing in firms that bypass the prospectus and registration process. The answer is definitely 
yes:  IPO-listed  firms  perform  better  than  RM-listed  firms.  This  effect  is  consistent  with  a 
permanent effect of the listing choice on the cost of capital and on the stock prices. Such an effect 
is similar to the observation that dual class firms trade at a lower prices than do single class firms, 
both at the IPO and for at least the subsequent five years (Smart, Thirumalai and Zutter 2008). 
The observation of lower returns following RM is also consistent with behavioural explanation of 
larger  valuation  errors  for  more  opaque  and  more  asymmetric  issues.  However,  our  results 
indicate that the cost of capital effect, associated with the rational investors is more important 
than the overoptimism effect due to irrational investors.   
It is noteworthy that we find a significant impact of the auditor‟s prestige when, and only 
when,  the  firm  chooses  to  disclose  and  list  after  an  IPO.  This  result  confirms  the  fact  that 
certification matters only in the case of disclosure. This suggests that it is worth exploring in 
further research the issue of why firms hire a prestigious auditor when they choose an RM.    
Overall, our results suggest that disclosure characteristics, including timeliness, certification 
and validation by a securities commission, as well as the reputation of the listing process have a 
significant economic impact at the listing time and after that. These results are consistent with 
theories suggesting that a  commitment by  a  firm  to  submit themselves to  a strict  disclosure 
process  lowers  the  information  asymmetry  component  of  the  cost  of  capital,  reduces  the 




Appendix: Steps of a reverse merger (RM) listing based on a capital pool shell and evidence of 
the sources of information asymmetry  
Step  Who is involved  Asymmetry factors  Time line 
1 Incorporation 
of the CPC 








Likely to share some 
information with the promoters 
2 weeks 
3 IPO of the shell  Investors  By rule of the program, the 
target should not be identified at 
this stage. Target is likely to be 
unknown by these investors 
even if promoters of the shell  
know it.  
4 weeks 
4 Pre-RM private 
placements (PPs) 
in the shell or in 
the target 
Private investors   Private investors can be aware 
of the forthcoming RM but no 
formal information has been 
filed at this time. Public 
investors only observe the PP. 
Shell promoters have identified 
the target. 
Min: 2 or 3 weeks 
Max: 18 months 
5 Active trading 
on the shell 
shares 
Public investors  No information has been filed.  
However, there is strong 
increase in volume and price on 
the market.
34  
Up to the RM 
6 Press release 
and information 
circular  
Public and private 
investors, shareholders 
of the target firm 
Forthcoming PPs are announced 
in the circular as required by 
policy 5.2. Most of the PPs have 
already been completed or 
booked. 
Min: 2 weeks after the 
IPO; Max: 18 months 
after the IPO 
7 PPs & RM  Public and private 
investors, shareholders 
of the target firm 
Classical asymmetry between 
investors and newly listed 
company exists at this stage, but 
the time allowed to reduce this 
asymmetry is very short.  
As soon as the stock 
exchange have accepted 
the documents 
8 Subsequent PPs 
or Seasoned 
equity offerings 





                                                 
33  Two  indirect  proofs  of  this  statement  are  the  fact  that  several  CPC  promoters  are  managers  or 
administrators of the future target and the fact that the time period between the CPC IPO and the RM can 
be very short. Approximately a third of CPCs conclude their RM in the few months following the shell 
creation. 
34 In an analysis of the stock market performance of capital pool companies before the RM, Carpentier and 
Suret (2008) show that when the RM is completed during the six months following the IPO of the capital 
pool company, the monthly excess return from the IPO up to the RM is 4.71% per month. As the 
promoters of a CPC obtain their shares at half of the IPO price, their return should be 9.42% per month or 




Figure 1: Illustration of the reverse merger listing method 
 
Former shell's shareholders: 100,000 / 700,000 = 14.29%
Private placement Former operating company's shareholders:
$100,000 500,000 / 700,000 = 71.42%




5 for 1 1 for 1
Public shell Private operating company
value: $100,000 value: $500,000
500,000 shares x $0.20 500,000 shares x $1





Table 1: Number of Characteristics of New Listings in Canada, 1993-2003 
 
This table presents the number of characteristics of new listings in Canada, 1993-2003, 
depending on the choice of the listing process. For RMs, which include traditional RM and 
resulting issuers (RI) of capital pool companies (CPC), the proceeds are the amount levied 
by private placements during the 12 months following the listing. Initial public offerings 
(IPOs)  include  units  and  shares  offerings  by  firms  other  than  mutual  funds,  limited 
partnerships, demutualizations and privatizations. Gross proceeds are in CAN$ million. 
Panel A presents the population. Panel B presents the final sample which is restricted to the 
observations  with  complete  information.  Nb  means  number  of  observations.  Sources: 
Financial Post, FPinfomart.ca and Alberta Stock Exchange 
 
year  IPOs  Reverse Mergers (RMs and RIs of CPC) 
    Gross Proceeds    Gross Proceeds 
    Nb  Total   Mean  Median   Nb  Total   Mean  Median 
Panel A: Population                   
1993  142  3,709.88  26.13  10.48  82  140.63  2.10  0.75 
1994  118  3,314.28  28.09  2.11  99  107.40  2.07  0.64 
1995  89  665.61  7.48  1.35  125  198.51  3.05  1.15 
1996  143  2,486.84  17.39  3.00  132  228.26  2.59  1.02 
1997  187  4,354.63  23.29  1.60  142  312.49  2.74  0.90 
1998  100  2,186.80  21.87  1.80  167  331.31  2.27  1.20 
1999  68  1,185.29  17.43  2.04  129  258.43  2.27  1.20 
2000  77  1,875.34  24.36  4.20  132  372.72  3.01  1.63 
2001  32  208.65  6.52  1.56  110  316.14  2.95  1.75 
2002  32  771.22  24.10  1.50  127  172.26  2.33  0.54 
2003  36  570.67  15.85  1.79  139  291.45  2.75  1.00 
Total  1,024  21,329.20  20.83  2.48  1,384  2,729.60  2.58  1.10 
Panel B: Final Sample                   
1993  110  2,941.05  26.74  11.94  25  68.71  2.75  1.50 
1994  75  2,383.85  31.78  4.43  17  23.77  1.40  0.00 
1995  42  396.14  9.43  1.50  24  48.65  2.03  0.21 
1996  77  1,903.69  24.72  11.00  45  84.96  1.89  0.41 
1997  111  2,265.05  20.41  1.92  75  156.23  2.08  0.59 
1998  67  1,536.10  22.93  1.71  116  238.90  2.06  1.03 
1999  46  705.90  15.35  2.85  98  222.12  2.27  1.13 
2000  69  1817.26  26.34  4.50  92  277.80  3.02  1.65 
2001  26  107.31  4.13  1.91  88  294.33  3.34  1.87 
2002  30  765.76  25.53  1.50  92  100.16  1.09  0.00 
2003  31  537.91  17.35  1.70  99  238.63  2.41  0.82 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
   IPO  RM    
Panel A: Main characteristics                         
   #  mean  median  % Neg  #  mean  median  % Neg  p value 
                   
Gross proceeds, in $M (GP)  684  22.46  3.51    771  2.28  1.00    0.000*** 
Age at listing (AGE)  682  9.81  4.64    383  6.07  3.38    0.000*** 
Pre listing SE, in $M (SE)  684  25.96  1.19    771  2.49  0.40    0.050** 
Revenues, in $M (REV)  684  66.41  0.88    771  2.81  0.20    0.000*** 
Earnings, in $M (E)  684  1.66  -0.04  59.94  771  -0.41  -0.07  71.85  0.075* 
Cash / TA  619  -1.90  -0.27    620  -1.42  -0.20    0.544 
Rel. Sales to price (R S/P)  413  1.06  0.39    434  1.68  0.47    0.000*** 
Rel. Earnings to price (R E/P)  247  1.24  0.57    153  2.28  0.47    0.002*** 
Rel. Book to price (R B/P)  513  1.91  1.12    507  3.55  1.39    0.000*** 
Panel B: Dummy variables                 
    in %        in %       
Profitability                   
No revenues  684  31.14      771  30.22      0.704 
Revenues, EPS<0  684  30.26      771  44.49      0.000*** 
Sector                   
High Tech  684  28.51      771  28.40      0.965 
Materials & Energy  684  41.67      771  37.61      0.115 
Auditor                   
Prestigious  684  44.01      726  35.67      0.001*** 
Non-prestigious  684  55.99      726  64.33      0.001*** 
Underwriter                   
Prestigious  684  27.19      0  -      - 
Non-prestigious  684  72.81      0  -      - 
Period                   
Rm3m1  684  3.91  4.14    771  2.05  2.27    0.000*** 
Rm6m1  684  8.50  9.63    771  4.10  6.23    0.000*** 
Rm12m1  684  16.87  18.73    771  9.06  9.23    0.000*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics and tests of equality between the groups based on the listing 
mode for initial public offerings (IPOs) and reverse mergers (RMs) of the final sample. Rel. means 








Table 3: Probability of IPO and RM 
Dependent variable  DIPO  DIPO 
   1  2 
Intercept  -1.903***  -2.231*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
DHT  0.245***  0.148 
     (0.009)  (0.227) 
DNR  0.698***  1.024*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
DOG  0.118  0.444*** 
     (0.263)  (0.003) 
LogAsset  0.215***  0.276*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
Rm12m1  1.300***  2.024*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
DNE  -0.177**  -0.033 
     (0.035)  (0.772) 
Pre B/M  -0.135***  -0.115*** 
     (0.000)  (0.001) 
AGE    0.006 
       (0.229) 
PFcash/TA    -0.010 
       (0.453) 
Chi 2  257.718***  262.090*** 
Prob > Chi 2  (0.000)  (0.000) 
This table presents a model of the choice between initial public offerings (IPO) and reverse 
mergers (RM). We estimate the following Probit model: Probability modeled is DIPO=1.  
For i = 1 to n, with: DIPOi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm lists after an IPO 
and 0 otherwise. The probit procedure models the probabilities of having DIPOi = 1; DHTi is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuing firm belongs to the high tech and bio tech 
industry and 0 otherwise; DRNi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuing firm belongs 
to the resources industry and 0 otherwise; DOGi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
issuing firm belongs to the oil and gas industry and 0 otherwise; Logasset is the log of total 
pre  listing  asset.  Rm12m1  stands  for  the  index  return  during  the  12  months  before  the 
listing, from -12 to -1. DNE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuing firm reports 
negative earnings before the listing. Pre B/M is the Pre-money book to market ratio. Age is 
the number of years since the incorporation of the firm. PFcashTA is the Pro forma cash / 
TA = [cash, deposit + short-term invest in year 1 less gross proceeds] divided by the total 






Table 4: OLS Regressions of Relative Valuation Multiples 
 Dependent variable 
Model 1: Relative Sales 
to Price Ratio,  
R S/P 
Model 2: Relative 
Earnings to Price Ratio, 
R E/P 
Model 3: Relative Book 
to Price Ratio, 
R B/P 
Intercept  -0.070  0.249  0.453  0.144  2.776***  4.039*** 
     (-0.191)  (0.484)  (0.653)  (0.128)  (3.925)  (4.034) 
DIPO  -1.175***  -1.177***  -1.365***  -1.359***  -1.809***  -1.812*** 
     (-6.888)  (-6.895)  (-4.005)  (-3.977)  (-6.226)  (-6.244) 
PAUDIT  -0.053  -0.058  -0.106  -0.097  0.151  0.106 
     (-0.343)  (-0.375)  (-0.365)  (-0.330)  (0.540)  (0.378) 
LogAsset  0.209***  0.209***  0.185**  0.190**  0.062  0.057 
     (5.316)  (5.294)  (2.492)  (2.513)  (0.854)  (0.779) 
DNE  -0.093  -0.083      -0.237  -0.204 
     (-0.575)  (-0.515)      (-0.756)  (-0.649) 
DHT  0.318*  0.326*  0.593*  0.607*  0.848**  0.887** 
     (1.814)  (1.856)  (1.671)  (1.698)  (2.360)  (2.467) 
DOG  0.538***  0.556***  0.524  0.526  0.054  0.112 
     (2.703)  (2.781)  (1.379)  (1.382)  (0.137)  (0.284) 
DNR  1.768***  1.762***  0.440  0.468  0.051  0.144 
     (4.508)  (4.490)  (0.672)  (0.708)  (0.126)  (0.354) 
Rm12m1  0.599  0.637  0.413  0.437  1.351*  1.453** 
     (1.529)  (1.617)  (0.496)  (0.523)  (1.890)  (2.028) 
Lambda    -0.966    0.752    -3.716* 
       (-0.891)    (0.351)    (-1.780) 
Number of observations  794  794  381  381  955  955 
Adjusted R2  0.079  0.079  0.032  0.029  0.043  0.045 
This table presents OLS regression analysis of relative valuation multiples on listing method, auditor 
choice and control variables. Each valuation metrics is divided by the median of the same quantity for 
the  population  of  similar  sector/size/profitability  firms.  The  sample  is  reduced  to  the  firm s  with 
positive sales (Model 1), with positive earnings (Model 2) and with positive book value (Model 3). 
Each  model  is  first  estimated  without  the  Heckam‟s  Lambda,  and  then  including  this  variable  to 
control for the self-selection. DIPOi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm lists after an IPO and 
0 otherwise. PAUDITi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big Four 
(five) and 0 otherwise. DNE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuing firm reports negative 
earnings before the listing. LogAsset is the log of total pre-listing asset. DHTi, DOGi and DNRi are 
dummy variables that equals 1 if the issuing firm belongs to the high tech and bio tech industry, 
Natural resources and Oil and Gas respectively and 0 otherwise; Rm12m1 stands for the index return 
during the 12 months before the listing, from -12 to -1. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, *** 







Table 5: Comparisons of the Distributions of Raw and Excess Returns of Newly Listed Firms 
 
Quantiles and statistics  BHRE  BHAR 
100% Maximum  32.000  31.043 
99%  8.906  7.713 
95%  2.903  2.357 
90%  1.671  1.166 
75% Quartile 3  0.320  -0.141 
50% Median  -0.439  -0.867 
25% Quartile 1  -0.794  -1.419 
10%  -0.950  -2.434 
5%  -1.000  -3.188 
1%  -1.000  -4.746 
0% Minimum  -1.000  -8.306 
Mean  0.171  -0.588 
Skewness  7.010  5.076 
This table presents estimates of raw returns (BHRE) and buy and hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) for the final sample of initial public offerings  (IPO) and reverse merger (RM) 
listings that occurred from January 1993 through December 2003, for the 3-year horizon 






Table 6:  Abnormal Returns of Newly Listed Canadian Firms Depending on the Listing Mode 
and Tests of Differences 
 
Panel A: IPO vs. 
RM  All  IPO  RM  p-value 
Mean Raw Return (1;36) 
   Mean  1442  0.1710  683  0.2640  759  0.0874  0.0001*** 
   Median    -0.4394    -0.3176    -0.5408  0.0001*** 
BHAR (1;36) 
   Mean  1442  -0.5875  683  -0.3320  759  -0.8175  0.0000*** 
   Median    -0.8675    -0.7081    -1.0378  0.0000*** 
Alpha (1;36) 
   Mean  1455  -0.1467  684  -0.1145  771  -0.1753  0.0000*** 
   Median    -0.0141    -0.0196    -0.0038  0.8931 
 
This table presents estimates of raw returns (BHRE) and adjusted buy and hold return estimated 






Table 7:  Cross Sectional OLS Regression of Long Run Abnormal Returns on Listing Method  
 
   BHRE (1;36)  BHAR (1;36) 
Intercept  -0.542***  -0.548**  -1.569***  -1.704*** 
     (-3.227)  (-2.297)  (-7.865)  (-5.950) 
DIPO  0.179**  0.179**  0.338***  0.339*** 
     (2.439)  (2.439)  (3.870)  (3.881) 
PAUDIT  0.096  0.096  0.205**  0.209** 
     (1.354)  (1.353)  (2.432)  (2.473) 
LogAsset  0.059***  0.059***  0.085***  0.085*** 
     (3.336)  (3.331)  (4.019)  (4.006) 
DNE  -0.144*  -0.144*  -0.252***  -0.255*** 
     (-1.830)  (-1.829)  (-2.697)  (-2.724) 
DHT  0.103  0.103  0.254**  0.250** 
     (1.165)  (1.159)  (2.404)  (2.365) 
DOG  0.696***  0.695***  0.604***  0.596*** 
     (7.049)  (7.007)  (5.119)  (5.032) 
DRN  0.223***  0.222**  0.117  0.106 
     (2.187)  (2.152)  (0.965)  (0.859) 
Rm12m1  -1.023***  -1.024***  -0.583***  -0.596*** 
     (-5.689)  (-5.657)  (-2.721)  (-2.768) 
Lambda    0.020    0.413 
       (0.038)    (0.656) 
Number of observations  1313  1313  1312  1312 
Adjusted R2  0.073  0.079  0.073  0.079 
 
This table examines the determinants of stock performance over a three-year horizon following 
the listing. Stock performance is measured using the raw return, BHRE (1;36) and the adjusted 
buy and hold return estimated against reference  portfolios, BHAR (1;36). Each model is first 
estimated without the Heckam‟s Lambda, and then including this variable to control for the self-
selection. DIPO is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm list through an IPO and 0 is 
the firm uses a RM. PAUDIT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is audited by one of 
the Big Four (five) and 0 otherwise. Logasset is the natural logarithm of the total asset before the 
listing. DNE is an indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm has negative earnings 
during the year prior to the listing transaction. DHTi, DOGi and DNRi are dummy variables that 
equals 1 if the issuing firm belongs to the high tech and bio tech industry, Natural resources and 
Oil and Gas respectively and 0 otherwise; Rm12m1 stands for the index return during the 12 
months before the listing, from -12 to -1. t-statistics are in parentheses.  *, **, *** Significant at 







Table 8: Cross sectional Ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression of long-run abnormal returns 
on listing method by type of listing.  
   BHRE (1;36)   BHAR (1;36)   BHRE (1;36)   BHAR (1;36) 
  IPO  RM  IPO  RM  IPO  RM  IPO  RM 









     (-1.707)  (-1.358)  (-4.133)  (-4.807)  (-2.062)  (-1.292)  (-3.973)  (-4.519) 
PAUDIT  0.185*  -0.030  0.248**  0.107  0.208*  -0.034  0.248**  0.085 
     (1.712)  (-0.332)  (2.057)  (0.906)  (1.906)  (-0.367)  (2.033)  (0.706) 
LogAsset  0.068**  0.032  0.095***  0.064**  0.098***  0.030  0.097***  0.056* 
     (2.553)  (1.291)  (3.203)  (2.011)  (3.006)  (1.210)  (2.668)  (1.707) 
DNE  -0.054  -0.196**  -0.024 
-
0.438***  -0.106  -0.196**  -0.037 
-
0.437*** 
     (-0.434)  (-2.007)  (-0.174)  (-3.453)  (-0.819)  (-2.005)  (-0.254)  (-3.451) 
DHT  0.168  0.002  0.327**  0.134  0.186  0.001  0.311*  0.128 
     (1.206)  (0.018)  (2.114)  (0.927)  (1.298)  (0.011)  (1.945)  (0.889) 
DOG  0.665***  0.731***  0.557***  0.607***  0.624***  0.732***  0.552***  0.613*** 
     (4.103)  (6.126)  (3.068)  (3.929)  (3.749)  (6.127)  (2.961)  (3.967) 
DRN  0.050  0.447***  -0.182  0.415**  0.042  0.444***  -0.180  0.398** 













0.965***  -0.400 
     (-3.185)  (-5.254)  (-2.808)  (-1.452)  (-2.966)  (-5.255)  (-2.736)  (-1.492) 
DEXCH          -0.234  0.081  -0.034  0.523 
             (-1.462)  (0.266)  (-0.188)  (1.325) 
VBIPO          0.038    0.108   
             (0.231)    (0.599)   
PUND          -0.053    -0.023   
             (-0.353)    (-0.137)   
Number of 
observations  667  646  673  639  667  646  673  639 
Adjusted R2  0.051  0.107  0.069  0.051  0.050  0.106  0.065  0.052 
This table examines the determinants of stock performance over a three-year horizon following the 
listing. Stock performance is measured using the raw return, BHRE (1;36), the adjusted buy and hold 
return estimated against reference portfolios and BHAR (1;36). Each model is first estimated for the 
IPO subsample and then for the RM sub-sample. PAUDIT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
company is audited by one of the Big Four (five) and 0 otherwise. Logasset is the natural logarithm 
of the total asset before the listing. DNE is an indicator variable which is equal to one if the company 
has negative earnings during the year prior to the listing transaction.  DHTi, DOGi and DNRi are 
dummy variables that equals 1 if the issuing company belongs to the high tech and bio tech industry, 
Natural resources and Oil and Gas respectively and 0 otherwise; Rm12m1 stands for the index return 
during the 12 months before the listing, from -12 to -1. DEXCH is equal to 1 if the exchange of 
listing is the TSX and 0 otherwise. VBIPO is 1 if the IPO is backed by a venture capitalist and 0 
otherwise. PUND is 1 if the underwriter is prestigious and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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